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Wellesley College and National Bureau of Economic Research
Roughly thirty years ago, Haber and Murray (1966) published a vol 
ume on the condition of the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system in 
the United States. In terms of financing UI, the main controversies of 
the day included the financial stability of the system and the nature of 
the tax structure, called experience rating, that charged a higher tax rate 
to firms with greater layoff experience. They wrote the following:
The recent indication of weaknesses in many state [UI trust] funds 
has given new importance to the consideration of measures to pro 
tect the adequacy of state unemployment insurance funds (Haber 
and Murray 1966, p. 318)
In addition, they posed the question:
In what ways could experience rating systems be improved or 
modified so as to contribute toward sounder financing? (p. 319).
Today, these issues continue to be some of the main controversies in 
financing UI. Concern about the potential for financial problems in the 
system was almost prophetic. The financial condition of the UI system 
continued to deteriorate and, during the recessions of 1973-75 and the 
back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s, many states had to borrow 
funds from the federal government to cover their benefit payments. The 
situation improved somewhat over the long economic expansion of the 
middle and late 1980s. However, following this long expansion and a 
relatively mild recession in 1990-1991, the financial condition of the 
UI system in 1993 was considerably weaker than at virtually any time 
since its inception in 1938.
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One potentially important contributor to the changing financial sta 
tus of the UI system is the taxable wage base. Over the past thirty 
years, the rapid rate of price increases considerably eroded the taxable 
wage base, or the maximum amount of earnings upon which UI taxes 
are levied. The relatively small growth in the nominal wage base has 
been considerably more than offset by inflation. Tax rates were 
required to rise correspondingly to finance higher and higher benefits. 
The wisdom of this approach is certainly open to question today.
The issue of experience rating has also received considerable atten 
tion over the past three decades, particularly in the academic literature. 
Experience rating means that a firm's UI taxes are set so that its tax 
burden increases as it lays off more workers. The focus of recent 
research regarding experience rating is its potential effect on temporary 
layoffs. Because the current financing system is only imperfectly expe 
rience rated (i.e., additional layoffs do not always result in a higher tax 
burden), some have argued that this provides firms with an incentive to 
lay off workers. The financial condition of the UI system will be weak 
ened if firms follow through on this incentive to a significant degree.
This chapter reviews the financial condition of the UI system, the 
taxable wage base, and the effects of an experience-rated UI tax. To 
begin, a brief discussion of the financial structure of the UI system will 
be presented. This will be followed by a report on the results of an 
analysis of over fifty years of financial data from the UI system, taking 
into consideration some of the consequences of a low taxable wage 
base. The experience-rated nature of the UI tax will then be analyzed. 
Institutional features that create imperfections in experience rating and 
the economics literature that has examined the effects of these imper 
fections on temporary layoffs will be discussed. Finally, conclusions 
and implications for policy will be drawn.
Financial Structure of the Unemployment Insurance System
The system of financing UI benefits in the United States is con 
trolled at both the federal and state levels of government. Some aspects 
of the system are dictated directly by the federal government, and some 
are determined entirely by the states. This part of the chapter will
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briefly describe the role played by each level in financing the system.' 
A flow chart displaying this information is presented as an appendix to 
the chapter.
Financing Regular Benefits
To pay for regular UI benefits, all employers are subject to a federal 
unemployment insurance tax equal to 6.2 percent of their federal tax 
able payroll. A federal tax credit of 5.4 percent is available, however, 
for firms in states that have met a series of federal guidelines. These 
guidelines require that, among other things, states have in place their 
own tax system with some form of experience rating, charging a lower 
tax rate to firms who lay off fewer workers. Since all states meet these 
guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 percent 
of federal taxable payroll. 2 This federal component of the tax is prima 
rily used for administrative expenses and to pay for the federal share of 
extended benefits. Federal revenues collected in excess of these 
expenses go into a trust fund used to finance loans to states whose trust 
funds have become insolvent.
Although state tax systems are required to meet certain guidelines, 
these standards are generally quite broad. For instance, the federal tax 
credit is awarded to firms in states that have an experience-rated tax 
system, but the type of system employed is chosen at each state's dis 
cretion. In addition, the federal taxable wage base is currently set at 
$7,000 per covered worker, but states have the option to set a higher 
taxable wage base. As a result of the latitude allowed in the guidelines, 
state tax systems often exhibit substantial differences. The variation 
across states in taxable wage bases and in experience-rating systems, in 
particular, is explored in greater detail later in this chapter.
Financing Extended Benefits
Extended benefits (EB), or benefits paid to unemployed workers 
beyond the regular benefit exhaustion date during periods of recession, 
are financed differently than are regular UI benefits. The cost of pro 
viding benefits of this type is split equally by the federal and state gov 
ernments. As indicated, part of the federal component of the UI payroll 
tax contributes to a trust fund that accumulates during periods of pros-
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perity to pay for the federal component of extended benefit costs dur 
ing an economic downturn. The state component of EB is paid for with 
reserves in the state's UI trust fund.
This system of financing extended benefit payments became quite 
important during the most recent recession in 1990-1991. Problems in 
the methods that trigger EB prevented the system from making pay 
ments to workers in many locations during the downturn, as described 
in chapter 6 of this volume. As a result, a stopgap measure, the Emer 
gency Unemployment Compensation Act (EUCA), temporarily pro 
vided benefits with the same intent. In those locations where EB had 
been triggered, states had the option to terminate these payments and 
to replace them with EUC benefits. The program, however, was 
financed entirely by the federal government, as opposed to being split 
by the state and federal governments. As a result, state UI reserves 
were depleted to a far lesser extent over this period than they had been 
in previous recessions.
Loans to State Governments
The strain imposed during recessions has often led to insolvency in 
state trust funds, particularly following the 1975 and 1982-1983 reces 
sions. To provide assistance in such a crisis, the federal government 
established a system of loans that can be made to the states to finance 
these temporary shortages in reserves. When the system was instituted 
in 1954, it was very generous to the states. States had up to four years 
to repay the loan with no interest. If the loan were not repaid during 
that period, payment would be made by reducing the credit allowed 
against the federal UI payroll tax until the repayment took place. This 
system amounted to a several year interest-free loan from the federal 
government to the states. The incentive to borrow eventually became 
apparent as loans became quite common by the late 1970s; by 1979, 25 
states had borrowed over $5.6 billion (Blaustein 1993). As a result, 
loan provisions have been restricted over time. The biggest change in 
the system took place in 1981, when the federal government started 
charging interest on funds borrowed.
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Trends in Funding and the Taxable Wage Base
The financial condition of the UI system has weakened considerably 
over the past several decades. This section of the chapter will more 
fully explore the financial difficulties experienced by the system and 
then move on to address a potential cause of the problem, a low and 
largely unindexed taxable wage base. For this purpose, financial statis 
tics will be examined that are aggregated over all states between the 
years 1938 and 1993. 3 Although each state administers its own UI sys 
tem and some generalizations may not be appropriate for all states, the 
decision to use aggregated data is driven by the desire to draw conclu 
sions regarding the UI system as a whole.
Financial Condition of the Unemployment Insurance System
Over the years, state UI trust funds have fallen dramatically and 
have become increasingly likely to experience a deficit during a major 
recession. Figure 8.1 represents this pattern. It depicts the ratio of the 
balance in state UI trust funds (net reserves) to total annual wages paid 
over roughly the past half century. 4 This ratio provides an indicator of 
the health of the UI trust fund, such that larger ratios indicate larger 
reserves. As trust funds are depleted, the ratio will approach zero, and a 
negative ratio indicates a deficit in the funds. A strong cyclical compo 
nent is apparent in figure 8.1, with the ratio of net reserves to wages 
paid increasing during expansions and falling during recessions. This 
makes sense because, during an expansion, relatively high employment 
leads to larger tax revenues and fewer UI recipients while, in a down 
turn, relatively high unemployment leads to smaller tax revenues and 
more UI recipients.
The overriding trend apparent in the figure, however, is towards 
lower fund reserves. In fact, the relatively large recessions of 1975 and 
1983 led many state funds to run deficits that required loans from the 
federal government to pay for UI benefits. The extent of the problem 
was so severe in 1983 that the aggregate of all state trust funds was in 
deficit. Prior to this, state trust funds never came close to running out of 
money.
Many changes were made over the last two decades in an attempt to 
restore solvency to the system. In 1981, the federal government pro-
Figure 8.1 Ratio of Net Reserves to Taxable Payroll, 1938-1993
1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Unemployment Insurance in the United States 327
vided a strong incentive to states to keep their individual UI trust funds 
solvent by legislating that interest would be charged on future loans. To 
reduce UI expenditures, some states restricted eligibility so that fewer 
people could receive benefits. In addition, in the highly inflationary 
period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, many states did not increase 
UI benefits, leading to a benefit cut in inflation-adjusted dollars. In 
New York State, for example, the ratio of average weekly benefits to 
average weekly wages, sometimes referred to as the replacement ratio, 
fell from 0.326 in 1979 to 0.279 in 1982.
The biggest change in the states, however, was observed in the tax 
rates assigned to the payrolls of employers. The time series of the aver 
age employer tax rate is depicted in figure 8.2. Again, a strong cyclical 
pattern is observed in this figure. During and just after a recession, tax 
rates rise to cover the additional liabilities accrued by the system dur 
ing the downturn. Ignoring the cyclically, the trend is towards higher 
tax rates since the early 1950s. For example, the average employer tax 
rate (as a percentage of taxable payroll) following the economic expan 
sion of the late 1960s and early 1970s was under 1.5 percent. In 1990, 
after another long expansion, the average rate was about 2 percent.
The increase in average tax rates masks some of the variability 
across firms. Those firms at the maximum tax rate have faced a large 
rise in tax payments. This pattern in the data can be seen in figure 8.3, 
which represents the average tax schedule for states employing the 
reserve ratio method of financing over the period 1978-1987. The 
beginning and end points of this time span follow the end of a major 
recession by a few years and represent roughly comparable points in 
the business cycle. The schedules show that there has been a secular 
increase in tax rates for those firms who lay off a lot of workers, lead 
ing to a negative reserve ratio. The maximum rate increased from about 
4.5 percent in 1978 to almost 7 percent in 1987. 5 There has been some 
change in tax rates faced by firms with lower reserve ratios, but there is 
no obvious pattern to these changes. The conclusion apparent from this 
figure is that states have attempted to recoup some of their increased UI 
expenditures from the firms with the greatest layoff history.
Although these changes have improved the financial picture of the 
UI system over the past decade, its condition is still relatively weak by 
historical standards. Referring back to figure 8.1, the economic expan 
sion of the middle and late 1980s restored UI trust funds to a level not
Figure 8.2 Average Employer Tax Rates, 1938-1993
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seen since 1974. The mild recession of 1990-1991 led to a relatively 
small reduction in the size of the fund. 6 However, a severe recession 
could again lead to insolvency in many states. Reductions in the trust 
find equal to those encountered in either the 1973-1975 or 1981-1982 
recession would once more exhaust aggregate reserves in state UI trust 
funds.
The Taxable Wage Base
The taxable wage base is another component of the UI financing 
system subject to federal regulation. The federal government sets a 
minimum wage base, currently $7,000, which must be met by all 
states. Thus, employers only pay UI taxes on the first $7,000 of each 
worker's earnings. States have the option of setting a taxable wage base 
above the federal minimum. In 1994, thirty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia elected to set a higher taxable wage base, although it was 
$11,000 or less in 24 of these states (the level of the tax base for each 
state is presented in table 8.1). In addition, seventeen states have 
indexed their wage base, usually as a fraction of the average earnings 
level in the state. Most of the bigger states, however, have not done so. 
For example, the wage base in New York, California, and Florida is 
$7,000, while the wage base in Texas and Illinois is $9,000.
With the exception of the minority of states that have indexed their 
taxable wage base, adjustments are generally made in an ad hoc man 
ner; without legislation specifying an increase, the wage base remains 
constant. Adjustments have only been made sporadically since it was 
first established in 1939, and inflation has severely eroded its real 
value. In 1940, the taxable wage base was set at $3,000, equal to aver 
age annual earnings at that time. After adjusting for inflation, this base 
would provide roughly $31,000 worth of buying power today, which is 
about four and one-half times the current $7,000 wage base. Moreover, 
this method of financing stands in stark contrast to that of the social 
security system, where legislation was first passed in 1972 to automati 
cally adjust its taxable wage base to keep pace with inflation. In 1940, 
the base in the social security system also equaled $3,000. As of 1972, 
the social security taxable wage base had climbed to $9,000, and the 
UI taxable wage had risen to $4,200. Today, the comparable figures are 
$53,400 and $7,000 for social security and UI, respectively.
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These patterns are shown in figure 8.4, which presents the fraction 
of covered earnings taxable by both the UI and social security sys 
tems. Throughout the 1940s, both systems taxed the same proportion 
of earnings. A series of ad hoc adjustments to the social security tax 
able wage base in the 1950s and 1960s maintained the wage base at a 
roughly constant level while the UI wage base continued to fall. 
Indexation and other tax increases actually raised the relative size of 
the Social Security taxable wage base while a few ad hoc increases 
only temporarily slowed the continued decline in the 1970s and 1980s 
in the UI system.
Problems with the Current System
A major deficiency in the current system of UI financing is that the 
infrequent, ad hoc adjustments to the taxable wage base lead to a con 
tinual erosion of its financial stability. The problem rests in a few sim 
ple accounting identities:
1. revenues collected are equal to the product of the tax rate and tax 
able wages paid in the state,
2. benefits paid out are equal to the product of the number of unem 
ployed, insured workers and the amount of benefits they collect, 
and
3. if the benefits paid out exceed the revenues collected, the balance 
in the UI trust fund must fall.
Even in the absence of severe cyclical downturns, these basic relation 
ships indicate that the current system of UI financing will drift towards 
insolvency. This is because benefit levels, for the most part, rise to keep 
pace with inflation, but taxable wages do not. As a result, benefit pay 
ments will continually increase more than revenues do and the trust 
fund will persistently decline. Short-term benefit reductions, penalties 
imposed for borrowing, and short-term tax rate increases cannot solve 
this problem in the long run. Moreover, this difficulty is unrelated to 
the outcome of the debate regarding the merits of a "forward-funded" 
UI system (i.e., a system that finances large benefit payments made 
during recessions by accumulating large reserves during booms rather 
than by borrowing), discussed in chapter 9 of this volume. Regardless
Figure 8.4 Fraction of Covered Earnings Taxable by UI and Social Security, 1938-1993
Social Security
Unemployment Insurance
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of the level of trust fund reserves deemed adequate, the accounting 
identities suggest that reserves will slip lower and lower and will even 
tually fall below that level.
To illustrate these concepts, figure 8.5 displays one measure indicat 
ing the generosity of UI benefits and one measure indicating the tax bur 
den imposed on workers' wages, where both measures are aggregated 
across states. The generosity gauge is the ratio of average weekly bene 
fits to average weekly wages. 7 It expresses the fraction of the average 
worker's wage that would be replaced by the average weekly benefit and 
is therefore sometimes called the replacement ratio. The tax burden 
gauge is the ratio of taxable wages to total wages paid in the state. It indi 
cates what fraction of wages earned are taxed by the UI system.
Figure 8.5 shows that the generosity of UI benefits has remained 
fairly constant over the past fifty years. The average weekly benefit 
would replace roughly one-third of the average worker's weekly wage. 
This figure also indicates, however, that the fraction of wages taxed by 
the UI system has fallen dramatically. While virtually all wages paid 
were taxable fifty years ago, only around one-third are currently tax 
able. The decline in this ratio is a result of the increase in total wages 
paid at roughly the rate of inflation while taxable wage growth has 
been restricted due to the small and infrequent increases in the taxable 
wage base. The discrete rises in this ratio in 1972, 1978, and 1983 cor 
respond exactly with federally mandated increases in the taxable wage 
base. This pattern in the UI taxable wage base stands in stark contrast 
to the experience of the Social Security system.
The evidence presented in the figure suggests that, while the real 
generosity of the UI system has been largely constant over time, the tax 
burden falls almost unabatedly. Therefore, the simple accounting rela 
tionships clearly indicate that the system must move towards insol 
vency unless changes are made. Increasing tax rates continually is one 
approach to providing adequate funding for the system, even in the 
presence of a taxable wage base that is relatively constant in nominal 
dollars. Increasing tax rates can maintain the basic accounting identi 
ties if rates are raised fast enough to keep pace with the inflation 
adjustments made to UI benefits. In fact, a pattern like this has taken 
place over the past two decades, as shown in figure 8.2 and 8.3, and as 
discussed earlier in the chapter. This approach, however, creates differ 
ent problems, which are explored in the following section.
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Tax Rates and Low-Wage Workers
A payroll tax that only applies to earnings up to a specific level 
results in a greater proportion of earnings being taxed for low-wage 
workers than for high-wage workers. Both social security and UI taxes 
share this feature, whose effect depends upon the incidence of the pay 
roll tax. 8 If the tax is paid largely by firms, it provides a disincentive for 
firms to hire relatively less skilled workers. If the tax is passed along to 
workers in the form of lower wages, it is a form of regressive taxation. 
Either way, low-wage workers are hurt disproportionally by this type 
of tax.
The problem with the UI tax is that it has historically had a roughly 
constant taxable wage base and an increasing tax rate. As the taxable 
wage base is eroded by inflation, only lower- and lower-wage workers 
remain taxed on all or most of their earnings. Similarly, the taxable 
wage base becomes a very small part of a high-wage worker's earnings 
as wages grow with inflation. Therefore, the additional burden of the 
tax borne by low-wage workers is growing over time.
Again, historical characteristics of the UI system aggregated across 
states will illustrate this point. Table 8.2 considers three hypothetical 
workers: one is a low-wage earner (making $5,000 per year in current 
dollars), one is a moderate-wage earner (making $25,000 per year in 
current dollars), and the third is a high-wage earner (making $75,000 
per year in current dollars). The Consumer Price Index is used to con 
vert these dollar amounts to comparable levels of purchasing power in 
1954, 1969, and 1989. These years are chosen because they all repre 
sent low points in tax rates following an extended economic expansion. 
Using the historical tax rates and the federally mandated taxable wage 
base for those years, an estimate is obtained of the percentage of each 
worker's income paid to UI taxes. 9
The results presented in table 8.2 demonstrate quite clearly the 
increasing tax burden faced by low-wage workers or by the firms that 
employ them. In 1954, a firm employing a low-wage worker paid 1.12 
percent of the individual's wage as UI taxes, about five times the per 
centage (0.22) paid by a firm employing a high-wage earner. A firm 
employing a moderate wage earner paid 0.65 percent. Regressiveness 
in the system grew somewhat during the relatively low inflation years 
between 1954 and 1969. In the latter year, the tax burden for a low-
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wage worker increased slightly to 1.38 percent, while the high-wage 
worker's burden fell to 0.2 percent, one-seventh the rate for the low- 
wage worker. The middle-wage worker's tax burden stayed roughly 
constant. By 1989, however, the inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s 
led to vastly different tax burdens. The tax imposed upon a firm 
employing a low-wage worker increased to 2.18 percent of his/her 
earnings. This is about 20 times the percentage paid by a firm employ 
ing a high-wage worker, which dropped to 0.09 percent. Between 1954 
and 1989, the tax burden facing low-wage workers doubled, while the 
burden facing high-wage workers was cut in half.



















































































Thus, disproportionate costs may be borne by low-wage workers or 
by the firms that employ them as a result of the historical pattern of 
maintaining a relatively constant taxable wage base while increasing 
tax rates to finance inflation-adjusted benefits. Low-wage workers 
either become more and more expensive employees relative to high- 
wage workers or are subject to an increasingly regressive tax, depend 
ing upon the incidence of the tax. This effect will continue until the 
taxable wage base is indexed.
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Experience Rating and Employment Fluctuations
Another area in which state financing systems differ is in the way 
they implement experience rating. Recall that an experience-rated state 
tax system is required for firms to take a credit against the federal UI 
tax. The method by which taxes are experience rated, however, is left 
to the discretion of the states and has led to differences across states. 
This part of the chapter will explore the various types of systems used 
and will then proceed to review the evidence regarding claims that the 
current system provides firms with an incentive to lay off workers.
State Tax Systems
The two most common ways of computing the tax rate a firm will be 
charged are the reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods. Financing sys 
tems of these types are in place in thirty-three states and seventeen 
states, respectively. The remaining states have systems that are less 
common and will not be described here. 10
Under a reserve ratio financing system, a "bank account" is estab 
lished for each firm, with tax payments added to the account and UI 
benefits drawn from it. The reserve ratio is the ratio of the reserves in 
the firm's account to the average taxable payroll of the firm over, typi 
cally, the past three years. Firms with a high reserve ratio have contrib 
uted considerably more in taxes than they have paid out in benefits. In 
contrast, firms with a negative reserve ratio have paid out more in ben 
efits than they have paid in taxes.
Tax rates are assigned according to a tax schedule that relates a 
firm's reserve ratio to a specific tax rate. A simplified version of a tax 
schedule is presented in figure 8.6. A firm's UI tax rate is a decreasing 
function of its reserve ratio, subject to a minimum and a maximum 
rate. When a firm lays off workers, the benefits paid to that worker are 
charged to the firm's account. Its reserve ratio, therefore, falls. For a 
firm with a "moderate" reserve ratio (i.e., those firms located on the 
sloped portion of the tax schedule) laying off an additional worker will 
increase its tax rate. This represents the experience-rating feature of the 
UI tax system. On the other hand, if the firm lays off enough workers, 
its reserve ratio will fall beyond the point where the tax rate rises above 
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to an increase in the tax rate charged to the firm. Moreover, a firm that 
lays off relatively few workers and has a high reserve ratio will still pay 
the minimum tax rate if it lays off an additional worker. It is for these 
reasons that the system is said to be imperfectly experience rated.
Tax rates in a benefit ratio system are more directly linked to the 
level of benefits received by a firm's laid-off workers. This system ties 
a firm's UI tax rate to the ratio of the benefits drawn by its employees, 
typically over the past three years, to the size of its taxable payroll dur 
ing those years. A tax schedule then relates the firm's benefit ratio to a 
tax rate that it must pay. The tax schedule is similar in nature to that 
presented in figure 8.6, with the obvious exception that the benefit ratio 
rather than the reserve ratio belongs on the x-axis. Again, moderate 
layoff firms face tax rates that increase with their layoff experience. 
The existence of a minimum and maximum tax rate indicates that the 
system is only imperfectly experience rated.
Across states, tax levels vary dramatically. Table 8.3 presents the 
minimum, maximum, and average tax rates for all states in 1993. Max 
imum tax rates range from 5.4 percent in several states (the minimum 
allowed by federal law) to 10 percent in Michigan. Average tax rates 
range from 0.5 percent in South Dakota to 4.8 percent in Pennsylvania 
and New York.
Tax Systems and Experience Rating
In describing the reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems, the feature 
of imperfect experience rating shows up quite clearly because of the 
presence of the minimum and maximum tax rates. Imperfect experi 
ence rating creeps into the system in more subtle ways as well. This 
section will more fully explore this aspect of the tax system.
One method of assessing the degree of experience rating across 
states is the Experience Rating Index (ERI). This measure takes into 
account benefits paid out that do not increase the tax imposed upon 
firms because (a) the firm is at the minimum or maximum tax rate 
(ineffectively charged benefits), (b) the firm is no longer operating in 
the state (inactive charges), or (c) the benefit payments are not charged 
back to the employer's account for some other reason (noncharged 
benefits). Noncharged benefits may result, for instance, if a state elects
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to make payments to workers who quit their job after a disqualification 
period or if the payments represent extended benefits. 
Formally, the ERI is computed as
ERI = 100 - %IEC + %IAC -I- %NNC
where %IEC represents the percentage of benefit payments that are 
ineffectively charged benefits, %IAC indicates the percentage of bene 
fit payments that are charged to inactive firms, and %NNC is the per 
centage of payments that are not charged to firms. An ERI of 100 
indicates that all benefits are charged to firms and that the degree of 
experience rating is complete. An ERI of zero would show that no ben 
efits are charged to firms and that there would be no experience rating. 
Table 8.4 presents the ERI and its components for all states in 1994. A 
significant degree of variation is present in these data. For example, the 
ERI in North Carolina is only 31 percent compared to 84 percent in 
New York.
Although the ERI is a comprehensive source of data regarding the 
current status of experience rating, it does have some limitations, as 
highlighted by Vroman (1986, 1994). First, the ERI is just a snapshot 
of the relationship between benefit payments and tax liabilities. It does 
not take into account the fact that benefits incurred today will lead to 
higher future tax payments by experience-rated firms. Second, the lag 
between benefit charges and tax increases leads to cyclically in the 
ERI. When a recession begins, benefit charges increase, but taxes for 
experience-rated firms do not rise until the following year. Therefore, 
the fraction of benefits that are ineffectively charged will appear to 
increase. At the end of the recession, this lag will lead tax payments to 
grow more rapidly than benefit payments and will reduce the ERI. This 
cyclical component has nothing to do with structural changes in the UI 
financing system and may provide policy makers with misleading data.
Recent empirical research in the academic literature has utilized an 
alternative indicator of the degree of experience rating a firm faces 
through a concept called the marginal tax cost (MTC). The MTC is 
designed to measure the additional tax burden for a firm if it lays off a 
worker and that worker receives one dollar in UI benefits. For firms at 
the minimum or maximum tax rate in either type of system, the MTC 
is zero since tax rates would be unaffected.














































































































































































































































































346 Financing Benefit Payments
For firms between the minimum and maximum rates, however, the 
MTC is probably not equal to unity (i.e., the firm's tax burden will not 
increase by one dollar) in either the reserve ratio or benefit ratio financ 
ing systems. Consider a firm in a reserve ratio state that has constant 
employment. 11 If this firm is located along the sloped portion of the tax 
schedule and it pays out a one-dollar UI benefit, its reserve ratio will 
fall and its taxes will increase in the following year. If the additional 
tax liability in the next year is less than one dollar, then the firm will 
not have yet fully repaid the dollar in benefits. Its reserve ratio will still 
be higher than it was before the benefit payout and it will again face a 
somewhat higher tax rate in the following year. This pattern will repeat 
itself until the full dollar is repaid.
Although full repayment would indicate perfect experience rating, 
that repayment may have taken place over several years. Therefore, the 
present discounted value (PDV) of the additional taxes paid will actu 
ally be less than one dollar, indicating imperfect experience rating. 
Since the "imperfection" rests in the PDV calculation, two factors that 
influence the degree of experience rating become apparent. First, the 
slope of the tax schedule will influence how quickly the dollar is 
repaid. If the slope is steep, the dollar will be repaid more quickly and 
the MTC will be closer to unity. 12 Second, the interest rate used in the 
PDV calculation will influence the MTC. Higher interest rates will 
reduce the degree of experience rating.
This approach to Calculating the MTC and incentives for firms is 
based upon a small change in benefit payments that is, perhaps, appro 
priate in examining temporary layoffs. A reduction in the size of a 
firm's workforce through permanent layoffs, however, may similarly 
be subsidized by the UI system. Brechling and Laurence (1995) point 
out that large changes in employment not only alter the tax rate, but the 
size of the payroll upon which that tax has to be paid. Because the total 
tax burden decreases in response to such downsizing, they argue that 
this type of system encourages firms to lay off workers in this context 
as well. Limited empirical research has considered the response of 
employers to this incentive, and the remaining discussion will focus on 
the effect of experience rating on temporary layoffs.
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Experience Rating and Temporary Layoffs
The employment effects of imperfect experience rating have gener 
ated a significant amount of research over the last two decades. The 
approaches taken to examine this issue have developed considerably 
over the period and will be summarized in this section of the chapter. 
The survey provided here is not intended to be complete but is pre 
sented as an overview of developments in the literature. Previous sur 
veys can be found in Brechling (1977), Topel and Welch (1980), and 
Hamermesh (1990).
Theoretical foundations for this research were laid by Feldstein 
(1976), Baily (1976), and Brechling (1977). The effect of imperfect 
experience rating on layoffs was addressed in the context of an implicit 
contract model. In this type of model, there is some form of long-term 
attachment between firms and workers. Imperfect experience rating 
leads to layoffs because layoffs are subsidized. If a firm lays off a 
worker, the UI benefits received by that worker are greater than the 
additional tax costs faced by the firm. If firms and workers have a long- 
term attachment, both firms and workers can benefit from this subsidy 
if the firm cycles workers through temporary spells of unemployment. 
The firm will benefit because it can pay the workers a little less. Work 
ers will benefit because their total compensation, equal to wages and 
UI payments, will be higher. Therefore, firms will use temporary lay 
offs to extract the subsidy regardless of demand conditions, but partic 
ularly during periods of low demand.
Initial attempts to empirically test this proposition typically ana 
lyzed the effects of differences in parameters of the UI system on lay 
offs. Feldstein (1978) used microdata from the 1975 Current 
Population Survey to examine the probability of being on temporary 
layoff on the survey date as a function of the average weekly UI benefit 
in the worker's state. Since the absolute size of the subsidy created by 
imperfect experience rating grows with the benefit level, he hypothe 
sized that benefits should be positively correlated with the probability 
of temporary layoff. The results from Feldstein's analysis supported 
this hypothesis and led to the conclusion that a large share of tempo 
rary layoff unemployment is created by imperfect experience rating. 
Brechling (1981) used aggregate industry level data by state for the 
years 1962-1969 to examine the impact of parameters of the tax sched-
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ule itself, such as the maximum tax rate and the slope. As discussed 
earlier, a higher maximum or a steeper slope will increase the degree of 
experience rating and should reduce layoffs. Support for this relation 
ship is observed, particularly in response to differences in the maxi 
mum tax rate.
The next major advance in this literature came in a series of papers 
by Topel (1983, 1984, 1985). A significant contribution made by Topel 
was his parameterization of the degree of experience rating. Rather 
than bringing specific components of the UI system into his empirical 
work, Topel introduced the concept of the marginal tax cost, measuring 
the amount of a one-dollar benefit that is repaid by the firm in the form 
of higher taxes. This parameterization provided a convenient approach 
to observing that experience rating is imperfect even for firms between 
minimum and maximum tax rates. Moreover, it provided a useful way 
to simulate what would be the effect on temporary layoffs if the experi 
ence rating were complete. Changing the MTC from its current level to 
unity would approximate the effects of instituting a UI system with 
perfect experience rating.
Topel's research computed the degree of experience rating aggre 
gated across firms in twenty-nine different industries for several states 
and a few years. Using microdata from the Current Population Survey, 
he estimated models of the probability of being on temporary layoff as 
a function of the MTC. Findings from this research uniformly showed 
that workers employed in states and industries with a lower degree of 
experience rating were significantly more likely to be temporarily laid 
off. Movement from the current system to one with complete experi 
ence rating would lead to approximately a one-third to one-half reduc 
tion in temporary layoff unemployment, according to Topel's 
estimates.
A problem with the research completed to this point was that it 
ignored the effects of imperfect experience rating on layoffs at differ 
ent times in the business cycle. The theoretical literature based on 
implicit contract models indicated that an effect should be observed in 
all periods but that it should be stronger during cyclical downturns. The 
next advance in this literature explicitly incorporated differences over 
the business cycle in the analyses.
The theoretical basis for much of this work also changed from an 
implicit contract model, stressing long-term attachments between firms
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and workers, to adjustment cost models that place importance on the 
costs of changing the size of a firm's workforce (Anderson 1993; Card 
and Levine 1994). An experience-rated UI tax is treated as an adjust 
ment cost. Firms that want to reduce the size of their workforce will 
have to incur a greater firing cost the greater the degree of experience 
rating. Importantly, firms that want to hire workers must also take this 
cost into consideration because they will face a higher cost should they 
decide to lay off those workers sometime in the future. Therefore, not 
only does a greater degree of experience rating reduce the incentive to 
lay off workers during an economic downturn, it reduces the incentive 
for firms to hire workers during an expansion. In other words, the 
greater the degree of experience rating, the less the variability in 
employment over the business cycle. This pattern is depicted in figure 
8.7.
Depending upon the data set employed, there are significant differ 
ences in the empirical tests of this proposition. Card and Levine (1994) 
use 10 years of data from the Current Population Survey; estimate 
MTC measures by state, industry, and year; and assign these measures 
to each individual in the sample. Their approach is similar to the one 
taken by Topel, except that they explicitly model the effect of the MTC 
on temporary layoffs in each year over the 10-year span from 1978- 
1987, which included a severe recession and two periods of economic 
growth. They find that imperfect experience rating may be linked to as 
much as 50 percent of temporary layoffs during the recessionary years 
of 1982-1983, but that there are considerably smaller effects at the 
peak of the business cycle in 1979 and 1986-1987. Similar results are 
observed for temporary layoffs over seasonal patterns of employment 
demand throughout the year. The advantage of the approach employed 
by Card and Levine is that it utilizes a largely nationally representative 
source of data over a long time period.
An alternative approach, implemented by Anderson (1993) and 
Anderson and Meyer (1994), is to use the information available in a 
unique source, the Continuous Wage and Benefit History (CWBH) 
data. The CWBH represents quarterly UI administrative records on 
firms and individuals in eight states between 1978 and 1984. The 
advantage of this data source is that an MTC measure can be created 
for individual firms and can then be applied to the employees of that 
firm. Although use of the CWBH data allows for firm-level analysis, it
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introduces other problems; results may only pertain to those states 
included in the survey and may not be nationally representative, and 
personal characteristics are not available in this data source and cannot 
be controlled for in the empirical work.
Using a subsample of firms in the retail trade industry from the 
CWBH data, Anderson (1993) examines the cyclical pattern of 
employment over a quarterly demand cycle as a function of the indi 
vidual MTCs of the firms. Consistent with an adjustment cost model, 
she finds that the peak-to-trough change in employment levels is 
smaller among firms that face a higher MTC (i.e. a greater degree of 
experience rating). Over the entire cycle, employment is shown to be 
slightly higher in firms facing a higher MTC.
Quite recently, Anderson and Meyer (1994) have used the CWBH 
data to carefully examine two potential problems that may have 
affected previous empirical work. First, they consider problems that 
may be present in the work by Topel (1983, 1984, 1985) and Card and 
Levine (1994), who utilize measures of the MTC evaluated at the state/ 
industry level. Previous research indicates that this approach masks a 
considerable degree of variability occurring across firms within states 
and industries (Anderson and Meyer 1993) and may result in biases in 
the estimated impact of imperfect experience rating. The results pre 
sented by Anderson and Meyer indicate that aggregation has only a 
small impact on the estimated effect of imperfect experience rating on 
temporary layoffs.
Possibly a more important problem addressed by Anderson and 
Meyer (1994) is the potential endogeneity of the MTC cost measures 
in models of temporary layoffs. 13 Since a firm's MTC is determined by 
its past layoff history, previous empirical models have estimated how 
temporary layoffs are affected by MTC, which is a function of lagged 
temporary layoffs. Serial correlation in a firm's layoff history will 
therefore lead to endogeneity bias. Moreover, in prior research estimat 
ing MTC measures aggregated to the state level, state tax schedules 
may have shown a response to the aggregate layoff behavior of firms in 
the state. If firms lay off many workers, state tax schedules may adjust 
to provide the necessary revenue to pay for the additional benefits. 14 
Anderson and Meyer find that, even after controlling for this source of 
bias, over 20 percent of temporary layoffs can be attributed to imper 
fect experience rating.
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Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has addressed two major developments in UI financing 
since Haber and Murray's 1966 volume. First, the financial condition 
of the system has been examined, along with the role that the structure 
of the taxable wage base has had on this condition. The system was 
shown to be financially weak and subject to insolvency should a major 
recession occur. Moreover, the low taxable wage base, which is mainly 
constant in nominal dollars, will continue to threaten the financial sta 
bility of the system unless continually rising tax rates provide an offset. 
This alternative may produce the necessary funds but will require the 
system to place a larger and larger tax burden on low-wage workers.
These factors highlight the need to index the taxable wage base. 15 
Although an increase in the wage base before instituting indexation 
may be desirable to help assure the solvency of the fund, it appears that 
such a tax increment would be impossible in the current political envi 
ronment. Indexation, on the other hand, is not a tax increase; it merely 
prevents inflation from eroding the current tax base.
The second goal of this chapter was to examine the effects of imper 
fect experience rating on temporary layoffs. The literature addressing 
this issue has developed considerably over the period. Additional 
econometric problems, more complicated statistical techniques, and 
more detailed data have emerged. However, empirical results have 
been remarkably consistent; a movement to a financing system with 
perfect experience rating will eliminate 20-50 percent of all temporary 
layoffs. Although there is relative consistency in these findings, recent 
evidence indicates that increasing the degree of experience rating will 
not come without a price. Treating the UI tax as an adjustment cost, it 
becomes clear that fewer layoffs during a downturn in economic activ 
ity may be matched by fewer new hires during periods of economic 
expansion. Some empirical research has supported this view.
These results provide no clear policy recommendations regarding 
experience rating. A system with a greater degree of experience rating 
may lead to less variability in employment over the business cycle than 
would a system with a lower degree of experience rating. An evaluation 
of which approach is preferable should, therefore, depend upon the 
average level of employment over the entire business cycle in the two
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systems. A higher level of employment, on average, in a system with 
less experience rating may compensate for the greater employment 
variability. Unfortunately, not enough research has been conducted to 
date to fully inform a policy conclusion here.
NOTES
I would like to thank Patty Anderson, Rob Pavosevich, and Bruce Vavnchek for comments on 
a draft of this chapter, Tara Gustafson for outstanding research assistance, and Mike Miller of the 
Unemployment Insurance Service for his help in obtaining some of the data used in the analysis
1 For more thorough discussions of the institutional features of UI financing, see Blaustem, 
Cohen and Haber (1993) or Vroman (1986, 1994).
2. Of this federal tax, 0.2 percent was originally imposed in 1977 as a temporary surcharge to 
build up reserves in an extended benefit trust fund It has been in place ever since.
3 These statistics are obtained from the U.S Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration (1983 and more recent supplements)
4 An alternative measure of the UI system's financial status is the high cost multiple, which 
expresses the fund reserves as a fraction of the highest 12-month benefit payout in the state's his 
tory. Trends in this measure are similar to those shown in figure 8.1 and are discussed in chapter 9 
of this volume.
5. Part of this increase may be explained by 1985 changes in federal guidelines that raised the 
federal unemployment tax to 6 2 percent and the tax credit to 5 4 percent for those states whose 
maximum tax rate was at least 5 4 percent This change came in response to the large number of 
state systems that were insolvent, indicating that many states would have had to increase tax rates 
anyway Therefore, a hypothetical illustration of changes in state tax schedules over this period 
without the alteration in federal policy would have likely looked similar.
6 As noted earlier, this experience is partly attributable to short-term problems in the EB sys 
tem that imposed the entire cost of benefits paid beyond the standard exhaustion period on the fed 
eral government. In recent recessions, the cost was split by the state and federal governments, 
imposing a far greater burden on state trust funds, this will probably also be true in the future.
7 Other measures of generosity, which are not explored in detail here, include the potential 
duration of benefits and the percentage of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits. On these 
scales, benefits have become less generous over time
8. Anderson and Meyer (1994) examine the incidence of the UI payroll tax and find that most 
of the tax is borne by firms
9 Results would be somewhat different for states that have chosen to increase their taxable 
wage base above the federally mandated level One can interpret the numbers provided here as 
representing workers who live in states like California or New York that have maintained their tax 
able wage base at this level
10. Details regarding other types of systems and an extended discussion of many issues in UI 
financing can be found in Becker (1972).
11. A similar analysis could be reported for a firm in a benefit ratio state but is omitted in this 
case for the purposes of brevity. See Card and Levine (1994) for a more formal treatment of the 
material presented here.
12. In fact, if the slope is "steep enough," it is possible for the MTC to be greater than unity.
13. Card and Levine (1992) also present an analysis of this problem, although one which is not 
as complete as that in Anderson and Meyer (1994)
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14. In fact, this effect is institutionalized in many states that have adopted a series of tax 
schedules. The particular tax schedule in effect at a point in time is a function of the size of the UI 
trust fund at that time. As the trust fund is drawn down during a recession, tax schedules increase.
15. The implications of increasing the federal taxable wage base have been addressed in detail 
by Cook et al. (1995).
Appendix to Chapter 8
The Role of Federal Financing
in the Unemployment Insurance System
Mike Miller 
U.S. Department of Labor
Although state unemployment insurance (UI) taxes pay the greater share of 
the overall costs of the UI system (approximately 75 percent over the 1988- 
1995 period), there is also a key role for federal financing. The overall funding 
flow of the system is summarized in appendix figure 8.1. Federal funding 
sources include both payroll taxes and general revenues. The three areas of the 
system that are federally funded are state and federal administration of employ 
ment security programs, various federal and extended benefits, and loans to in 
solvent States.
Federal Unemployment Tax Act
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (PUTA) tax is a national payroll tax 
collected by the Internal Revenue Service. The FUTA tax plays three different 
roles in the UI system. The first one, as has been discussed, is to provide a pow 
erful incentive for states to legislate a UI system that conforms to federal re 
quirements. This is accomplished by giving a large tax credit to employers in 
states with approved systems. The second role, which will be discussed further, 
is to provide a repayment mechanism for loans to states.
The third role is to provide financing for certain costs of the system. The 
items funded by the FUTA tax include UI administration, at both the federal 
and state levels, most federal and state Employment Service costs, veterans 
employment programs, labor market information programs, collection of the 
FUTA tax, management of the Unemployment Trust Fund, the federal share of 
federal-state Extended Benefits (EB), a portion of outlays under temporary re 
cessionary benefit extensions, and loans to states.
The current FUTA tax rate is 6.2 percent, payable on the first $7,000 of a 
worker's wages in a calendar year. Under normal conditions, employers re 
ceive a 5.4 percent tax credit, leaving a net effective tax rate of 0.8 percent of 
taxable wages. Appendix table 8.1 shows the history of the FUTA rate and tax 
able wage base. The current rate includes a 0.2 percent surcharge first imple 
mented in 1977 to repay a general fund debt caused by heavy outlays for EB 
and Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB). When the debt was repaid in 1987, 
the surcharge was scheduled to trigger off. However, Congress has chosen to
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extend this tax several times, usually for the purpose of federal deficit reduc 
tion. Currently, the effective rate is scheduled to drop from 0.8 percent to 0.6 
percent on January 1, 1999. No change has been made in either the effective 
tax rate or the taxable wage base since 1983.















































































Although the UI system is basically an employer-financed program, federal 
general revenues also play a role. In terms of size, one of the most important 
items funded from general revenues is all or part of the cost of temporary ben 
efit extensions, which are enacted by the Congress to provide additional bene 
fits during economic downturns. These benefits, which are typically 100 
percent federally funded, may be financed by either the FUTA tax or general 
revenues or both. The deciding factor usually has been whether or not suffi 
cient FUTA funds are available in the extended benefit account. General reve 
nues are used indirectly to pay for benefits for ex-federal workers and ex- 
servicemen, via reimbursements by the affected agencies. General revenues are 
used to pay for special programs that affect targeted groups, such as benefits 
under the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. General revenues also
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come into play as a borrowing source when the federal accounts are insolvent. 
In the past, general revenues were also used to pay for such temporary pro 
grams as Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) in the mid-1970s.
The Federal Accounts
There are four federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) that 
are used to provide federal financing. Some funding is also done0 directly 
through an appropriation.
Employment Security Administration Account
The Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) account is used 
to fund the administrative costs of the UI system and of other related employ 
ment security programs. Virtually all of the income to this account is from the 
FUTA tax. Items funded include all costs of UI administration at both federal 
and state levels. At the state level, in addition to UI administration, this account 
funds 97 percent of state Employment Service costs, two veterans employment 
programs, and labor market information programs run by the states for the Bu 
reau of Labor Statistics. At the federal level, this account pays for all Depart 
ment of Labor activities related to employment security programs. In addition, 
Treasury administrative costs related to collecting the FUTA tax and to man 
aging and investing the UTF are charged to the ESAA account.
Extended Unemployment Compensation Account
The Extended Unemployment Compensation Account (EUCA) pays for the 
federal share (50 percent) of benefit outlays under the permanent federal-state 
EB program. FUTA receipts are used for this purpose. EUCA is also used to 
fund temporary recessionary benefit programs, such as the recent Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program. Whether FUTA or general 
revenues are used to fund these programs, all funds flow through this account.
Federal Unemployment Account
The Federal Unemployment Account (FUA) provides loans to states under 
Title XII of the Social Security Act. All state loan repayments, either voluntary 
or through FUTA credit reductions, are deposited in this account, as are interest 
payments.
Each of these first three accounts (ESAA, EUCA, and FUA) earns interest 
at the same rate as is true for the state trust fund accounts. When any of these 
three accounts becomes insolvent, it may borrow interest-free from one of the 
other two. Interaccount borrowing first became effective in 1993. If the other 
accounts do not have sufficient balances to allow this, funds may be borrowed 
from general revenues, with interest.
359
Federal Employees Compensation Account
The Federal Employees Compensation Account (FECA) acts as a revolving 
fund to pay for two federal programs, Unemployment Compensation for Fed 
eral Employees (UCFE) and Unemployment Compensation for ex-Servicemen 
(UCX). States draw from this account to pay benefits, then provide information 
to the U.S. Department of Labor, which in turn bills the appropriate agencies 
on a quarterly basis. Reimbursements from the agencies then flow into the FE 
CA. General revenue advances may be made to the account if it becomes insol 
vent. These do not have to be repaid until the FECA balance is considered to 
exceed future needs.
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances
Federal Unemployment Benefits and Allowances (FUBA) is an appropria 
tion, rather than a trust fund account. Currently, this appropriation is used to 
fund benefits (after UI exhaustion) and training for import-impacted workers 
under the Trade Act. This appropriation has in the past been used to pay for a 
variety of federal benefit programs, including benefits for workers displaced by 
Redwood Park expansion, and benefits to Public Service Employment partici 
pants.
Account Flows and Ceilings
FUTA receipts currently flow into two accounts, ESAA and EUCA (appen 
dix figure 8.2). FUA also took in a share of FUTA receipts for three years, cal 
endar years 1988-1990, but currently gets only those receipts attributable to 
reduced credits for loan repayment. Eighty percent of FUTA receipts are re 
tained in ESAA, with the remaining 20 percent going to EUCA. The distribu 
tion of FUTA receipts has been changed a number of times over the years. 
Appendix table 8.1 shows the history of this distribution since EUCA was es 
tablished in 1970.
At the end of each fiscal year, a ceiling is applied to every account, and ex 
cess balances are transferred out (appendix figure 8.2). For ESAA, the ceiling 
is 40 percent of the spending of the current year from the account. For EUCA 
and FUA, the ceilings are percentages of total Ul-covered wages, one-half and 
one-quarter of 1 percent, respectively. The procedure for transferring excess 
balances is that first, EUCA and FUA balances are checked and any excesses 
are transferred to ESAA. Then, if ESAA has an excess, that excess is trans 
ferred to EUCA to the extent that account is below its ceiling. The remaining 
excess, if any, is transferred to FUA to the extent that account is below its ceil 
ing. In the event that all three accounts are at their ceilings at the end of a fis 
cal year, the remaining excess is distributed to state trust fund accounts in 
proportion to FUTA taxable wages by state. This is called a Reed Act distribu-
Appendix Figure 8A.2 Flow of FUTA Funds
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EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACCOUNT (ESAA)— finances administrative costs of employment 
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Ceiling (retained in this account at the beginning of a fiscal year): 40% of the amount appropriated for the prior fiscal year
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tion. A Reed Act distribution has occurred only three times, all in the mid- 
1950s. These funds, although residing in the state trust fund accounts, may be 
used for UI program administration.
Title XII Loans
An important aspect of federal financing is the Title XII loan system. Loans 
are available to states without any qualifying requirements other than insolven 
cy. States apply to the U.S. Department of Labor and are approved for specific 
amounts, but loans are made only to the extent a state's balance falls below zero 
on any given day. Loan funds come from the FUA account. Since 1982, interest 
has been charged on loans, except those that are repaid within the same fiscal 
year. The interest rate is equal to the average rate earned by the UTF during the 
last quarter of the prior year.
Repayments are made in one of two ways. The state may transfer monies 
from its trust fund account to the FUA account. Alternatively, there is an auto 
matic repayment mechanism that operates via the FUTA credit. In the third 
year of a loan, the 5.4 percent tax credit is reduced by 0.3 percent, making the 
effective FUTA tax rate 1.1 percent for employers in the affected state. The 
amount of receipts attributable to the credit reduction goes to the FUA account 
and reduces the state's outstanding loan balance. In subsequent years, as long 
as there is a loan outstanding, the credit is reduced by greater and greater 
amounts. The basic increment is 0.3 percent per year, but this can be varied us 
ing a calculation involving the state's average tax rate and benefit cost rate. To 
add further complexity, there are provisions for several types of tax relief. To 
receive relief for its employers, the state must apply to the U.S. Department of 
Labor and meet certain criteria related to solvency.
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